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Abstract 
 
Objectives - This paper is an exploration of the intellectual antecedents and philosophical assumptions that 
underpin the FairShares Model - a set of brand principles and Articles of Association published by the 
FairShares Association. It contributes to knowledge of the history of the social enterprise movement and its 
link to contemporary developments in mutual social enterprises.  
 
Prior Work - Previous contributions to the literature on social economy have drawn on communitarian 
philosophy to develop insights into mutual principles.  This paper sets out a theoretical framework to evaluate 
whether the FairShares Model represents a communitarian pluralist discourse on the constitution of social 
enterprises. 
  
Approach - In January 2013, the FairShares Association published guidance on the FairShares 'brand' and 
'model' (drawing on work presented at ISBE) to develop the concept of a ‘socialised’ enterprise . The 
framework developed from prior work is used to assess which aspects of communitarian philosophy are 
emphasized in both antecedent model rules (identified by the FairShares Association) as well as the 
FairShares Model (v1.2a). 
 
Results - The FairShares Model is theorised as a predominantly communitarian pluralist discourse with some 
‘corporatist’ commitments.  It represents an evolving set of guidelines for the ‘socialisation’ of enterprise by 
devising membership rights for two primary stakeholders (labour, users), and two secondary stakeholders 
(founders, investors).  It is designed to reverse the centralising and accumulating tendencies of the private 
sector without returning assets to state control.  It differs from philanthropic models by offering co-operative 
(par value) shares to three member classes: founders, labour and users, and (ordinary) ‘investor’ shares to all 
classes of member. 
 
Implications - The FairShares Model contributes to knowledge on the 'socialisation' of enterprise by 
identifying core characteristics of member-owned enterprises that deploy strategies for multi-stakeholder 
ownership, governance and management. 
 
Value – By operationalising a communitarian pluralist discourse in the process of constituting a social 
enterprise, the FairShares Model offers an alternative to private sector models based on the subordination of 
labour and mutual models based on the primacy of a single stakeholder group. 
Keywords: communitarian philosophy, co-operation, mutuality, social enterprise, social innovation 
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Introduction 
This paper examines the emergence of the FairShares Model – a set of principles for the constitution of social 
enterprises based on the integration of ‘founders’, ‘users’, ‘labour’ and ‘investors’.  It has emerged from the 
works of practitioners, academics and consultants who have a specialist interest in constituting (and studying 
the constitution of) co-operative and social enterprises.  The paper reflects on the founding research to 
answer the question ‘To what extent is the FairShares Model a communitarian pluralist approach to 
constituting social enterprises?’  By grounding a discussion in the systematic study of antecedent model 
Articles of Association, the paper contributes a new history to the development of social enterprise that is 
grounded in the praxis of communitarian pluralism.  
 The FairShares Model is presented by founders of the FairShares Association as a set of brand principles 
and collection of model rules for ‘self-governing co-operatives, mutuals and social enterprises’ (Ridley-Duff et 
al., 2013, p. 4).  Paradoxically, it is both an end point and start point for practitioner debates about 
constitutional issues: it represents an end-point for proprietary model rules abandoned in favour of the 
FairShares Model.  Concurrently, it represents a new starting point for a broad community of social enterprise 
practitioners to debate multi-stakeholder principles. 
 The paper is divided into five parts.  In the first part, we set out the assumptions of communitarian 
philosophy and distinguish unitary and pluralist applications.  In doing so, the concept of communitarian 
pluralism is defined with sufficient precision to act as a theoretical lens through which to assess the 
FairShares Model.  In the second section, we outline the methodology for the study and the source of 
information collected about the intellectual antecedents of the FairShares Model.  In the third section, we 
report our findings on historical precedents and antecedent model rules from which the FairShares Model 
takes its heritage.  This historical perspective enables links between concepts in the antecedents to be 
mapped against the concepts in the new model.  Having done so, we identify core propositions in the 
FairShares Model and argue that they represent a communitarian pluralist discourse on the ‘socialisation’ of 
enterprise ownership, governance and management.  To conclude the paper, we briefly compare this to 
discourses on ‘privatisation’ and ‘nationalisation’. 
Communitarian Pluralism 
Communitarian pluralism is a distinct strand of thought within the broader field of communitarian philosophy 
(Driver and Martell, 1997; Crowder, 2006).  In the context of business, communitarian philosophy has been 
linked to both collectivist forms of ownership and stakeholder (rather than shareholder) governance 
(Vinten, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2007, 2010). 
Communitarian philosophy positions itself in opposition to liberal writings on individualism. Influenced by 
theorists such as Avineri and de-Shalit (1992), communitarians criticise individualist philosophy on the basis 
that it misrepresents the individual in society.  They believe that people are profoundly influenced by social, 
cultural and historical contexts to the extent that their thoughts, desires, narratives of action and personal 
agency are all contingent on community relationships (Lukes, 1974, Habermas, 1987).   
Driver and Martell (1997) helpfully review the dimensions and arguments for variations in communitarian 
philosophy.  They identity three arguments: a) a sociological argument that people are primarily social beings 
rather than isolated individuals; b) an ethical argument that ‘community’ is ‘good’ because systems of 
collective provision secure individual well-being, and c) a meta-ethical argument that goodness and virtue are 
products of discourse in the community that cannot be standardised. While the above represent arguments for 
communitarianism, they leave open questions about the policies and practices that create a communitarian 
culture.  In an attempt to answer this, Driver and Martell (1997) created a theoretical framework for comparing 
‘unitarist’ (conformist) and ‘pluralist’ (liberal) variants of communitarianism (see Figure 3). 
Figure 1 – Dimensions of Communitarian Philosophy 
Conformist (Unitarist) Pluralist 
More Conditional  
(rights in return for responsibilities) 
Less Conditional  
(rights not conditional on responsibilities)  
Conservative  
(socially conservative) 
Progressive  
(socially liberal)  
Prescriptive  
(systems for the enforcement of social norms) 
Voluntary  
(loose networks with varying social norms)  
Moral  
(driven by religion and/or ideology) 
Socio-Economic  
(driven by self-regulating ‘relations of production’)  
Corporatist  
(rights / responsibilities apply to organisations) 
Individualist 
(rights / responsibilities apply to individuals)  
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 A unitary form of communitarianism is socially conservative, sets expectation of discipline from community 
members in observance of moral norms that represent the ‘conditions’ of community membership.  Moreover, 
unitary communitarians argue for the extension of these values to both ‘legal persons’ (i.e. incorporated 
organisations) and ‘natural persons’.  They set out expectations that corporations will accept a responsibility to 
contribute to community well-being.  A pluralist form of communitarianism does not make community 
membership conditional on obedience to fixed social norms.  As such it is more socially liberal, less normative, 
and adopts a socio-economic perspective that it is preferable for human values to be regulated by democratic 
institutions than by central religious or political ‘authorities’. 
Whereas Coase (1937) assumed that enterprise cultures are unitary because decisions are under the 
control of an entrepreneur, Tam argues for alternatives that:  
…treat [enterprise] workers, suppliers and customers, as well as their senior management and 
shareholders, as members of a shared community…Cooperation in this context does not mean 
bargaining to secure the best advantage for one's own group with minimal concession to others, but 
to developing shared values and long-term goals. 
Tam (1999:10) 
 In assessing the FairShares Model, it is worth noting Tam’s starting point: a multi-stakeholder orientation 
that includes “workers, suppliers and customers…senior managers and shareholders”.  He argues for 
co-operative inquiry to reconcile tensions in personal and group agendas.  Echoes of these sentiments 
emerged in empirical studies of the Community Company Model (Coad and Cullen, 2001; Ridley-Duff et al., 
2003; Ridley-Duff, 2010).  In a submission to a UK government consultation, social systems in the Community 
Company Model are identified for enterprise ‘ownership’, ‘governance’ and ‘management’.  Each is modified to 
allow groups with divergent interests to co-exist.   
 Prior work by Ridley-Duff between 2003 – 2012 identifies differences in unitary and pluralist approaches to 
enterprise development.  As a result, it is possible to summarise choices at incorporation (or conversion) 
linked to unitarist and pluralist systems of ownership, governance and management.  By using these choices 
as proxies, a framework for assessing the application of communitarian philosophy in the FairShares Model 
can be outlined (see Figure 2).   
Figure 2 – Communitarian Philosophy in Enterprise Design 
Proxies for a Unitarist Culture  Proxies for a Pluralist Culture Academic Sources 
Ownership 
Single class of 
shareholders/members 
Multiple classes of 
shareholders/members 
Atherton et al., 2012;  
Birchall, 2011, 2012; Ridley-Duff and 
Bull, 2011. 
Common ownership Joint ownership / co-ownership Gates, 1998; Brown, 2004; Reeves, 
2007; Ridley-Duff, 2007, 2012 
Owners / trustees from a single 
stakeholder group 
Owners / trustees from two or more 
stakeholders, particularly employees 
and community beneficiaries.  
Brown, 2006; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; 
Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2013. 
Governance 
Centrally controlled (hierarchy of) 
governing bodies 
Loose network of governing bodies Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Turnbull, 1994, 
1995, 2002. 
Representative democracy and/or 
autocracy 
Associative democracy and/or 
sociocracy 
Hirst, 1994; Romme, 1999; Romme, and 
Endenburg, 2006; Smith and Teasdale, 
2012. 
Single beneficiary group Multiple beneficiary groups Vinten, 2001; Ridley-Duff et al., 2003; 
Ridley-Duff, 2007; Chadwick-Coule, 
2011. 
Management 
One stakeholder’s political interests 
dominate 
Reconciliation / negotiation of 
stakeholder interests 
Amin, 2009; Ridley-Duff and Bennett, 
2011; Smith and Teasdale, 2012. 
Line management / line reporting 
systems 
Matrix management / flexible 
reporting systems 
Turnbull, 2002; Bull and Crompton, 
2006; Bull, 2007; Cathcart, 2009, 2013. 
Employment relations / economic 
entrepreneurship  
Member relations / associative 
entrepreneurship 
Chell, 2007; Scott-Cato et al., 2008; 
Erdal, 2011; Birchall, 2011. 
Recognising that there are different social systems for ownership, governance and management helps with 
interpreting paradoxes in studies of ‘alternative’ organisations.  For example Melman (2001) highlights how 
employee-ownership may not be accompanied by employee-participation in governance or management.  
Similarly, texts on employee engagement rarely move beyond detailed discussions of participatory 
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management to consider the role of ownership and governance (compare Macey and Schneider, 2008 with 
Matrix Evidence, 2010). 
Methodology 
This research treats the FairShares Model as a case study in social enterprise development (Rule and John, 
2011).  At this stage, the generalisability of the findings is less important than understanding them.  A rich 
case study interpreted through the lens of communitarian pluralism (Figures 1 and 2) provides a methodology 
for comparing different approaches to social enterprise.  This in itself represents a valuable contribution to 
knowledge. 
 In this study, the closeness of one author to the development of the FairShares Model creates a 
methodological challenge.  Ridley-Duff’s position as a co-author (and co-founder of the FairShares 
Association) increases the need for epistemic reflexivity (Johnson and Duberley, 2003).  For this reason, Bull 
– who has had no formal involvement in either the design of the FairShares Model or the founding of the 
association - provides critical oversight of the interpretation of the material and a third party perspective on its 
relevance to social economy.  To improve robustness, documentation provided by the FairShares Association 
was imported into NVivo for thematic analysis.  No restrictions were placed on access. 
 For Ridley-Duff, the study is an auto-ethnographic exploration of previous research (McIlveen, 2008; 
Chang, 2008), and the way this has contributed to the formulation of a set of principles.  A further motivation 
comes from founders and supporters of the FairShares Model who have requested clearer information on its 
core characteristics.  For Bull, the study represents an initial engagement with the FairShares Model to add to 
a programme of research on organisational identity in the social economy (see Seanor et al., 2013), strategic 
management in social enterprise (Bull, 2007) and conceptualisations of ethical capital (Bull et al., 2011).  
 Three data collection strategies have been adopted: 1) document analysis; 2) a survey of supporters; 
3) interviews with founders and supporters.  This paper reports findings from 1) - document analysis.  It uses 
theory to provide insights into context and history, based on a close reading of documentation collected 
between February and June 2013 from: 
 FairShares Model Dropbox (a collection of 154 documents shared by developers of the model).  
 FairShares Wiki (a collection of 178 web pages created for its registered supporters). 
Four documents were found to contain specific information about intellectual antecedents: 
 FairShares Basics.pss (showing links between social entrepreneurship and co-op development) 
 Antecedents of the FairShares Model (Case Studies).doc (four critiques of antecedent model rules) 
 FairShares Model – Introduction (see the section ‘Where do these ideas come from’?) 
 New Frontiers in Democratic Self-Management (a fresh comparison of three antecedent models)  
 A separate paper in 2014 will report findings from a survey and interviews with FairShares Association 
founders and supporters. 
The Origins of the FairShares Model  
The FairShares Wiki provides 'background' (www.fairshares.wikispot.org/background) which contains a short 
presentation on the roots of multi-stakeholder social enterprises.  This provides a historical context for debates 
about the development of FairShares.  Within this presentation is a diagram (Figure 3) which not only 
identifies traditions of consumer co-operation, social entrepreneurship and worker co-operation as key 
concepts, but also individuals and enterprises who have made significant contributions to practice.  
 Robert Owen lived from 1771 - 1858 and rose to prominence through New Lanark (a co-operative 
community).  He wrote extensively about the way 'character' is formed through educational processes and 
working conditions, and how investments in human capital benefitted both workers themselves and the 
financial well-being of factory owners (Owen, 1816).  The Rochdale Pioneers (to whom the Co-operative 
Group and the International Co-operative Alliance trace their history) included self-avowed 'Owenites'.  
Charles Howarth, the author the first Laws and Objects of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, and 
James Daly - the society's first secretary - were also former leaders of the Owenite movement in Rochdale 
(Wilson, Shaw and Lonergan, 2012; Ratner, 2013). 
 Birchall (2012) describes nine Rochdale Principles documented by George Holyoake over two decades 
(Holyoake, 1922 [1858], 2013 [1877]).  In the 1944 film The Rochdale Pioneers based on Holyoake’s histories, 
Charles Howarth is credited with devising a key innovation of the consumer co-operative model: paying 
dividends in proportion to trading activity rather than capital contributions.  Birchall (2012) noted that this social 
norm was so deeply internalised that it was unwritten until Holyoake’s work communicated it to the wider 
co-operative movement.  After codification of values and principles in 1937, an international movement 
developed that today has an annual turnover of more than $1.6 trillion (Euricse, 2012; Ratner, 2013).   
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Figure 3 – The historical foundations of multi-stakeholder social enterprise 
 
 Owen favoured co-operation at the level of the community, with industrial enterprises organised as 
producer co-operatives and mutual societies providing education and welfare.  This influenced subsequent 
thinkers including John Spedan Lewis (JSL) (1948, 1954) who regarded the John Lewis Partnership (JLP) as 
an experiment in industrial democracy based on a 'co-operative society of producers'.  JSL was also 
influenced by the Soviet Incops model of worker education studied by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Lewis, 
1948; cited in Cathcart, 2009).  JSL spoke out vehemently against both nationalisation (which he regarded as 
a pathway to soviet-style communism) and a private economy of "absentee-capitalists who [get] excessive 
reward for their function of saving and lending” (Lewis, 1948: 173).  He argued that owners should individually 
receive no greater compensation than professionals hired to run their organisations (Paranque and Willmott, 
2013), a view rooted in bitter family arguments after JSL discovered that one year his father took more money 
from John Lewis and Sons Ltd than the annual wage bill for 300 workers (Cathcart, 2009).  
 Owen was also an important influence on Fr. Arizmendi who drew on Owen’s work to formulate 
co-operative principles at Mondragon (BBC, 1980).  Arizmendi was influenced by Owen's writings on 
education and the formation of character as well as Rochdale Principles regarding democracy (one-person, 
one-vote) and open membership (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Birchall, 2012).  In adapting the principles, 
Mondragon’s founders developed producer co-operatives for industry and multi-stakeholder co-operatives 
(with both worker and consumer members) in banking, education and retailing (Ridley-Duff, 2010). 
Worker and Consumer Co-operation in Practice 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is now frequently cited in the press as a model for both private and public 
sector reform
1
.  As staff join, they become ‘partners’ of the JLP and beneficiaries of an Employee Trust that 
owns John Lewis Department Stores and Waitrose (a food retailer).  Partners do not buy shares, nor do they 
receive dividends.  Instead, they become beneficiaries of a trust that exists for their benefit.  In the last decade 
the trust has paid bonuses averaging 15% of salary (Cathcart, 2013).  Partners elect 80% of 82 members of a 
partnership council that handles social development, and 5 of the 12 directors that control commercial 
decisions.  The partnership council has the power to remove the Chair of JLP if he or she acts 
unconstitutionally.  In addition to store councils and management committees there is a company-wide 
magazine called The Gazette and a local magazine called The Chronicle for partners to engage in a constant 
dialogue with managers (Erdal, 2011).  Finally, the company operates a system called ‘The Registry’ through 
which partners employ staff to monitor executive performance outside of management control (Cathcart, 
2013).  As JLP is owned by shares held in trust, it is an example of common ownership, rather than joint 
ownership or co-ownership (Ridley-Duff, 2012). 
 The Co-operative Group, in contrast, operates a system of individual membership based on Rochdale 
Principles that have been reinterpreted in 1937, 1966 and 1995 by the International Co-operative Alliance.  
Customers, upon becoming members, have an account to hold their capital contributions and dividends.  
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Each member’s share of profits is dependent on levels of trading (in food retail outlets, pharmacies, a travel 
company, banking and financial service institutions, funeral directors, legal services and a motoring company).  
Rather than store councils (as happens at JLP), the Co-operative Group operate elected area committees.  
Regional committees uphold co-operative values and principles.
2
   
 Unlike John Lewis, Co-operative Group members contribute share capital to the organisation (albeit a 
nominal £1 deduction from their first member’s dividend).  The constitution of the Co-operative Group follows 
ICA guidelines (Cathcart, 2013) and is more readily understood as a jointly owned enterprise in which 
members control ‘co-operative capital’ (Brown, 2004).  In a jointly owned enterprise, members of a primary 
stakeholder group have personal accounts for capital contributions and entitlements to a share of surpluses. 
 A variation on this model is practised in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Whyte and Whyte, 
1991).  Fr. Arizmendi helped to establish industrial cooperatives to which members contribute capital (typically 
about two months pay at local rates).  About 20% is converted to co-operative capital (Democracy at Work, 
2013) while the balance becomes personal capital that attracts interest and an entitlement to a share of 
surpluses (typically 40-50% of the total).  While the amounts invested and distributed to individual members 
are higher than the Co-operative Group, the system is still based on members’ capital contributions, interest 
payments and dividend entitlements.  It is a system of joint ownership with commonly owned ‘co-operative 
capital’ in reserves and investment funds. 
 An interesting evolution of this, and an example of co-ownership, is the Caja Laboral.  This is the banking 
institution created to support the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and its individual member-owners.  
While John Lewis is wholly employee-owned, and the Cooperative Group wholly consumer-owned, the Caja 
has features of both.  Bird (2009) reports that the bank is 43% owned by workers and 57% owned by 
co-operatives.  The governing council is formed by electing four worker representatives and eight consumer 
representatives
3
.  The distribution of surpluses to staff is based not on the profitability of the bank, but on the 
profitability of its co-operative (business) members (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Davidmann, 1996).  Staff receive 
a share of surpluses based on how well their customers perform financially, not the bank.   
Figure 4 - Distinguishing Private and Member-Owned Enterprises 
Communitarianism
Identity is 
socially constructed
Private Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by founder(s) and 
investors to the exclusion of 
primary stakeholders
(Not a co-operative)
Common Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by a legal entity 
for a primary stakeholder 
with no share capital issued
(e.g. mutuals/cooperatives 
owned by trusts, mutuals 
and cooperatives)
Joint Ownership
Enterprises owned by a 
primary stakeholder group  
through individual member 
accounts.
(Mutuals/cooperatives jointly 
owned by individual 
members)
Co-ownership
Combining common and 
joint ownership systems to 
promote social solidarity 
between stakeholders.
(Mixed ownership systems 
that recognise individual and 
organisational members)
Pluralism
Society is best served by 
encouraging diversity
Unitarism
Society is best served 
by creating consensus
Individualism
Identity is 
a product of free will
 
Source: Ridley-Duff, 2012, Figure 4 
 These examples crystalize conceptual differences: private enterprises issue governance rights to founding 
entrepreneurs and institutional investors through share capital; commonly owned enterprises have no share 
capital so governance rights are ‘entrusted’ to a board; member-owned enterprises issue governance rights to 
members, and also issue (non-voting) share capital on the basis of member contributions to the enterprise 
(see Birchall, 2011, 2012; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011).  Where common ownership develops, this reinforces a 
unitary communitarianism by replacing the interests of an entrepreneur or small elite with those of a mass 
membership.  Rights and status are conditional on obedience to moral and social standards set by a 
legitimating authority.  Joint ownership and co-ownership differ by developing a pluralist form of 
communitarianism.  In this case, institutions are created to reconcile competing individuals and groups on the 
presumption that members have equal rights and status (see Figure 4). 
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Social Entrepreneurship  
Since the 1990s, entrepreneurial action in pursuit of social goals and society level transformations has been 
studied as a distinct discipline. Alvord et al. (2004) argue that social entrepreneurship has been theorised in a 
multitude of ways: as the use of business practices to make social organisations viable (Emerson and 
Twerksy, 1996); as action to make sustainable improvements in the well-being of marginalized communities 
(Dees, 1998; Nicholls, 2006); and as the reconfiguration of existing resources to improve welfare (Uphoff et 
al., 1998).  Recently, however, more focus has been placed on the value propositions of social entrepreneurs 
(Martin and Osberg, 2007; Chell, 2007), the social and ‘shared value’ they create (Porter and Kramer, 2011) 
and the social innovations that sustain them (Perrini and Vurco, 2006; Nicholls and Murdock, 2012).  In 
making sense of Figure 3, we emphasise Alvord et al.’s (2004) contention that social entrepreneurship can be 
regarded as a capacity for social innovation, particularly innovations that redistribute power and wealth to 
create a social economy (see Amin, 2009; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2013).  
 Robert Owen, the Rochdale Pioneers, John Spedan Lewis, Fr. Arizmendi (and those that subsequently 
built on their work) used business practices instrumentally to improve the welfare of their community.  Their 
social entrepreneurship is expressed through social innovations in the constitution of organisations that trade 
to secure long-term improvements in the well-being of primary stakeholders (labour, users) and secondary 
stakeholders (founders, investors).  Indeed, their work reframes who a ‘primary stakeholder’ is by redefining 
the role and rights of capital, criteria for enterprise membership, systems of reporting and accountability, and 
institutions that influence ‘voice’ in decision-making.  In each case, the private enterprise goal of generating a 
financial surplus and appropriating it from primary stakeholders is replaced by the social enterprise goal of 
generating a financial surplus in order to allocate it to them in fairer proportions. 
Integrating Co-operative Practices and Social Entrepreneurship 
Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011) identity four sets of multi-stakeholder model rules (see Appendix A) that are 
mature attempts to connect social entrepreneurship to constitutional reforms:  
1) Stakeholder Model Ltd devised by Geof Cox Associates;  
2) Co-operative CIC model devised by Co-operatives UK;  
3) NewCo Model devised by Morgan Killick and Bill Barker; 
4) Surplus Sharing Social Enterprise Model devised by Ridley-Duff.   
Further investigation of three of these models (Ridley-Duff, 2012) noted that the 2009 Somerset Rules also 
offer a multi-stakeholder model under Industrial and Provident Society Law (IPS).  As these are cited by the 
FairShares Association as immediate antecedents, we now trace the connection between the wider 
co-operative and social enterprise movements, the antecedent model rules, and the influence they have had 
on the FairShares Model.  
An introductory document (retrieved from www.fairshares.wikispot.org/FairShares_Model), states on 
p. 14-15 that the work of Jaroslav Vanek (1970) on Yugoslavia’s co-operatives is a key intellectual source for 
thinking on employee-ownership and worker co-operation.  Pateman (1970) identifies the Yugoslav economy 
as a rare governmental attempt to support a national programme of producer associations within a social 
economy.  Vanek argued that Yugoslav
4
 labour-managed firms bridged a social divide by removing ownership 
structures that created the incentive for managers to distance themselves socially from production workers.  
The logic of Vanek’s argument is repeated in the works of Ellerman (1984, 1990), Turnbull (1994, 1995, 2002) 
and Erdal (2000, 2011).  All argue that the employment relationship (within the firm) is a more significant 
source of exploitation and inequality than market exchange (outside the firm).  The subordination of labour 
through employment contracts alienates the workforce (labour) from both the surplus value and Intellectual 
Property they create.  It is the employment relationship - not market exchange - that is seen as the principle 
cause of poverty in post-industrial societies. 
However, this is just one of several arguments that underpin the FairShares Model.  A page of the 
FairShares Wiki offers alternative explanations for surplus generation and the way a FairShares Company or 
Co-operative should distribute surpluses: 
The FairShares Model is based on an acceptance that there is more than one way to generate a surplus. 
1.  Paying people who provide produce or labour less than their product or labour is worth;  
2.  Charging customers / users more for goods and services than it costs to produce them;  
3.  Investing finance in human, intellectual and social capital to reduce the costs of production. 
As there is no easy way to distinguish between labour, user and investor contributions to the creation of 
accounting surpluses, the members of a FairShares Company / Co-operative have to decide the proportion 
of profit/surplus to distribute as dividends to each group.  By default, a 50/50 division is assumed where 
there is one primary and one secondary stakeholder (e.g. User and Investor Shareholders, 
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or Labour and Investor Shareholders). Where there are two primary stakeholder groups, the default 
proportions are 35% (Labour), 35% (Users) and 30% (Investors). 
http://www.fairshares.wikispot.org/Who_creates_the_surplus, accessed 11
th
 July 2013. 
These ideas for constituting social enterprises can be found in antecedent models (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 – Direct Influences on the Antecedents of the FairShares Model 
Model Practitioner influences cited Theoretical influences cited 
Stakeholder Model Ltd (7.1) devised 
by Geof Cox Associates  to offer: 
- Stewardship Shares (trusteeship) 
- Partnership Shares (workers/users) 
- Investor Shares (supporters) 
 Kermase Food Co-operative 
 Fair Trade Movement  
 Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd 
 Lippy People (David Tomalin) 
 North East Music Co-operative Ltd 
 New Labour debates about the 
retention of ‘Clause 4’ and 
common ownership. 
 Co-operative journals / 
readings  
 Paul Golan and Anthony 
Jensen’s writings on industrial 
relations 
 (opposition to) Charlie Cattell’s 
single stakeholder / common 
ownership model 
Co-operative CIC (7.2) devised by 
Co-operatives UK to ‘consult’ with: 
- Employees, Funders 
- Suppliers, Customers 
- Community Representatives 
 Co-operative Legal Services 
 Co-operative movement members 
 UK Labour Government (1997 – 
2003) 
 Industrial and Provident Society 
Law 
 Rochdale Principles 
 ICA Co-operative Values and 
Principles 
(N.B. no single author cited) 
NewCo Model (7.3) devised by 
Bill Barker and Morgan Killick:  
- A Shares (entrepreneurs) 
- B Shares (clients / customers) 
- C Shares (employees) 
- Social Equity (supporters) 
 Sheffield Community Economic 
Development Unit (Bill Barker / 
Dave Thornett) 
 ESP Projects Ltd 
 Readings on ‘political economy’ 
(in the context of MA studies) 
 Karl Polanyi (“Great 
Transformation”) 
 
Surplus Sharing Model (7.4) devised 
by Ridley-Duff to offer: 
- Founder Shares (entrepreneurs) 
- Labour Shares 
- Investor Shares  
 
 Democratic Business Ltd  
(Gavin Boby) 
 Sheffield Co-operative 
Development Group (Alan 
Dootson) 
 School Trends Ltd (Peter Beeby 
and Rick Norris) 
 Employee Ownership Association 
(under David Erdal) 
 Mondragon Corporation (field visit 
hosted by Mikel Lezamiz) 
 Dr Poonam Thapa 
 Co-operative and Social 
Enterprise Journals 
 Guy Major and Gavin Boby’s 
writings on ‘equity devaluation’ 
and ‘value added sharing’ 
 The Community Company 
Model (see Coad and Cullen, 
2001). 
N.B. Major and Boby presented 
their findings in a conference on 
Vanek’s work, and also make 
specific mention of The Democratic 
Firm by David Ellerman as a key 
source. 
Sources: Cases 7.1 - 7.4 in Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011), and related background studies 
In the narrative provided by the FairShares Association (Ridley-Duff et al., 2013) the work of Guy Major 
and Gavin Body on a ‘Democratic Business’ model (Major, 1996, 1998; Major and Boby, 2000) is cited as a 
direct influence on the FairShares Model.  Adapted versions of their rules were developed at 
Computercraft Ltd to spin out First Contact Software Ltd (2001), at New Horizons Music Ltd (2006) and Social 
Exchange Ltd (2007)
5
.  In 2007, the ‘surplus sharing’ label (7.4) was attached when it was published by the 
Common Cause Foundation.   
 From 2007 onwards, the first signs of conscious convergence towards a FairShares Model begin to 
appear.  The ‘social economy’ shareholders of the NewCo Model (Case 7.3) and commitments to social 
auditing and fair trade principles in the Stakeholder Model appear in version 2.0 of the Surplus Sharing Social 
Enterprise Model (Case 7.4).  After Ridley-Duff interviewed Geof Cox and Morgan Killick in 2010 and 2012 to 
learn more about the development of Cases 7.1 and 7.3, the characteristics of share capital and the exclusion 
of pre-emption rights were reaffirmed, while modifications were made to the transferability of shares to reflect 
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debates about structuring fair trade supply chains and employee-owned companies (Davies et al., Doherty et 
al., 2013; 2009; Erdal, 2011).  Figure 6 (retrieved from the FairShares Wiki) shows how the FairShares 
Association links antecedent model rules to share classes in the FairShares Model. 
Figure 6 – Connecting Antecedent Model Rules to the FairShares Model 
 
Source: FairShares Basics.pps, www.fairshares.wikispot.org/Background, accessed 2
nd
 July 2013. 
The influence of antecedent model rules goes deeper than share types.  Case 7.1, 7.3 and 7.4 evolved multi-
stakeholder governance systems that enfranchise consumers and workforce members without marginalising 
social entrepreneurs: Case 7.1 provides for Stewardship Shares; Case 7.3 has ‘Class A’ shares; Case 7.4 has 
‘founder shares’.  Each model gives specific recognition and protection to the entrepreneurial labour of 
founders.  This is a clear difference to the Co-operative CIC (7.2) and Somerset Rules – while both make 
commitments to multi-stakeholder governance, they do not protect the position of founders.  Similarly, three 
cases (7.1, 7.3 and 7.4) include share types that function like Ordinary Shares in a private company.  While 
this is retained in the Company Law version of the FairShares Model, the IPS version integrates ideas found 
in Somerset Rules (allowing members a limited share of residual assets) and the Mondragon system of 
‘capital accounts’ (that protect each individual’s share of accumulated wealth). 
The FairShares Model depends on a capacity to issue shares and therefore is offered only under Company 
Law and Co-operative Law.  The Company Law version includes ‘investor shares’ that can grow in value, and 
which are subject to (restricted) trading rights permitted in employee-owned companies.  The Co-operative 
Law (IPS) version replaces ‘investor shares’ with ‘investor accounts’ that function like the ‘capital accounts’ at 
Mondragon.  Investor accounts accrue interest (following Rochdale Principles) and are credited with a share 
of surpluses (following Mondragon Principles).   In the next section, we evaluate these arrangements further 
using the proxies for communitarian pluralism (see Figures 1 and 2).    
Is this Communitarian Pluralism? 
Six variants of the FairShares Model are grouped into three pairs: 
1. Labour dominated (Worker Co-operative / Employee-Owned Social Enterprise) 
2. User dominated (User Co-operative / User-Owned Social Enterprise) 
3. No dominant group (Social Co-operative / Social Enterprise) 
The term ‘co-operative’ is used where incorporation takes place under Co-operative Law and ‘social 
enterprise’ is used where incorporation is under Company Law.  In other respects, the models are aligned and 
have similar articles of association that use the same clause numbering system. 
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Pluralising Ownership 
Three share types (founder, labour, user) are found across variants of FairShares.  These have a par value 
(i.e. they do not rise and fall in price) and regulate each member’s right to a ‘voice’, share of surpluses, and 
entitlement to acquire investor shares.  Founder shares only grant governance and (limited) management 
rights to their holders, while other share types entitle holders to dividends and a share of investment capital in 
addition to basic rights to participate in proposing and voting on ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ resolutions in general 
meeting.  The creation of share classes means that ‘class resolutions’ (on a one shareholder, one-vote basis) 
can be taken in specific situations, including key decisions on merging, selling or dissolving an enterprise.  As 
members acquire shares reflecting their participation, a founder can acquire labour and user shares, and user 
and labour shareholders can acquire investor shares.  Investors can only acquire other share types if they 
co-found, trade with or work in the enterprise. 
 The FairShares Model is, therefore, primarily based on joint and co-ownership principles.  With three share 
classes in variants 1) and 2) and four in variant 3) full provision is made for multi-stakeholder ownership: 
founder shares recognise entrepreneurial labour; labour shares recognise the labour of workers and 
employees, and can be extended to suppliers (including small producers) if voted for by members; user 
shares recognise the trading of individual consumers (whether direct or indirectly purchased), and can be 
extended to corporate consumers at the discretion of members.  Given the presence of share classes, rights 
and responsibilities can be regarded – to some degree – as ‘corporatist’ (see Figure 1).  While individualism 
dominates within classes and ordinary resolutions at general meetings, when a special resolution is required 
members vote as a class as well as individuals.  Group interests become important when the biggest 
decisions are made (e.g. constitutional changes, mergers, sales and dissolutions).  In short, a FairShares 
Company / Co-operative cannot be reconstituted, sold, merged or dissolved unless all classes agree. 
 There are also two ways in which common ownership is advanced.  Firstly, there is a ‘community dividend’ 
on dissolution if a start-up or development grant has been provided by a public or charitable source.  
Secondly, private shareholdings can be sold (or transferred) to organisations established for employee, 
community or charitable benefit (as happens in companies owned by employee-benefit and/or charitable 
trusts).  The model articles make financial provision for this through a mandatory redemption fund.  This fund 
acquires a share of surpluses to fund the re-purchase of member shareholdings (in the company version) and 
settle ‘investor accounts’ (in the co-operative version).  Eventually, these investment activities either reinforce 
joint and co-ownership system by distributing purchased shares to new (labour and user) members, or 
reinforce common ownership by transferring ownership to employee, community benefit or charitable trusts. 
 Pluralism is reinforced in another way by developing an idea (7.4) rooted in the ‘value added sharing’ 
arguments of Major (1996, 1998).  Major’s argument that co-operative structures suffer from ‘equity 
devaluation’ is evidenced by the manner in which demutualisation occurred in building societies (see Cook et 
al., 2002).  In mutual ventures, full (market) value is unrepresented in the capital structure.  Demutualisations 
occurred when managers familiar with private sector norms were able to ‘see’ the value hidden by 
co-operative accounting systems.  In the private sector, the concept of a ‘share premium account’ captures 
the difference between the original face value of a share purchase and its projected market value.  The value 
in the share premium account is appropriated by private shareholders through rules that prevent the issue of 
more shares without their consent, or pre-emption rights that give them a chance to purchase new share 
issues before they are offered to others.   
 In the FairShares Model pre-emption rights are excluded, and a provision in the constitution ensures that 
‘capital gains’ are distributed to (new) user and labour shareholders.  This is achieved through the allocation of 
investor shares (in companies) and credits to investor accounts (in co-operatives).  Half the capital gain each 
year is allocated to labour and user shareholders (ensuring that financial gains are credited to labour and user 
shareholders in the form of new capital or credits).  This ensures that members who have acquired labour 
shares (for their work) and user shares (for their trade) also acquire investor shares, and that the remainder of 
the capital gain raises the value of those shares (to the ‘fair price’).  If there are deficits, however, share values 
and account balances fall (as they do at Mondragon). 
Pluralising Governance and Management 
The second approach to communitarian pluralism – one which departs significantly from its antecedents - is a 
deep commitment to intellectual property (IP) using Creative Commons licencing.  Three antecedent models 
are published using a Creative Commons Licence that permits sharing and adaptation of IP.  However, in the 
FairShares Model is it proposed that all IP (by default) is Creative Commons.  In Ridley-Duff et al. (2013, 
p. 15) reference is made to a discussion document at Sheffield’s School for Democratic Socialism (organised 
by the local Co-operative Party).  The potential of Creative Commons to end worker alienation from their IP 
and the creation of an ‘intellectual commons’ is advanced as a response to Business Link advice that: 
The good news [for business owners] is that rights to IP created by employees generally belong to the 
employer. Showing that a member of staff has an employment contract is usually enough to prove you 
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own all IP rights. But it's a good idea to state the position explicitly in separate clauses of employees' 
contracts. This prevents any confusion arising - perhaps over work created outside office hours or as a 
by-product of specified work.  
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?itemId=1074300742&type=RESOURCES,  
accessed 8
th
 January 2012.  
 In private enterprises, the established norm is that the employer owns all IP - even from ‘work created 
outside office hours or as a by-product of specified work’.  Employees and customers have no copyright in the 
IP they create – it is transferred to the ‘legal person’ who employs or contracts them.  The FairShares Model, 
however, introduces itself with the following statement: 
Imagine an enterprise where the knowledge creation model of Wikipedia is combined with the 
governance model of the John Lewis Partnership and the values and principles of the Co-operative 
Group? 
www.fairshares.coop, accessed 11
th
 July 2013.      
 The knowledge creation system of Wikipedia is based on Creative Commons – a system of six licences 
that protect the creator of IP by requiring recognition of their contribution.  The individual creating IP can 
define the rights that others have in their creation.  This is taken up in Article 53 which states that a FairShares 
Company / Co-operative will:  
…ensure that ownership of all IP remains vested in its creator(s). For the avoidance of doubt, the 
[company] / [co-operative] shall not own IP created by members before, during or after their period of 
membership unless ownership is freely and voluntarily transferred by those members to the [company] / 
[co-operation].  
 Instead of ownership, a condition of membership is the granting of a licence to use members’ IP that 
includes an exclusive right to commercialise it until the member leaves.  After departure, the company / 
co-operative is granted a non-exclusive licence.  Cathcart (2013, p. 5) noted that John Spedan Lewis had a 
‘radical intent to share knowledge and power’ (Lewis, 1948, 1954).  In a contemporary context, this can be 
facilitated through Wikis where content is regulated by Creative Commons licences.  The FairShares Wiki is 
organised on this basis: some pages are open to the public; all content is accessible to registered supporters; 
editing rights are restricted to founder, labour, user and investor shareholders.  
 In practice, this system may face difficulties where IP is acquired from a third party, or where it is 
impossible to identify or agree which members created some IP.  The model rules do not resolve how IP will 
be owned where its creators cannot be identified.   However, the intent to create an intellectual commons for 
the benefit of members (and wider public benefit) is unambiguous.  Moreover, the numerous web-based Wikis 
now underpinning communities of practice suggest this is a viable low-cost proposition (Vickery and 
Wunsch-Vincent, 2007; Boulos and Wheeler, 2007). 
 The IP management arrangements, and multiple classes of shareholders, represent a ‘loose network of 
independent governing bodies’.  This looseness comes not just from the different shareholder classes, but 
from the arrangements for an intellectual commons (in which copyrights are held by whichever members’ have 
created them).  This strengthens the bargaining position of members in relation to managers because it is 
within their power to change an exclusive right to commercialise IP into a non-exclusive right (by leaving).  
This power is similar to the consumer power identified by Smith and Teasdale (2012) that could be transferred 
between mutual providers of welfare services.  Under FairShares arrangements, producers (employees) gain 
power in proportion to their capacity to produce IP, but – on account of the Creative Commons approach – 
cannot ‘privatise’ it, only take it elsewhere and develop it further.  Logically, this should lead to a more 
egalitarian culture, with member-to-member relations superseding employer-employee relations as more and 
more members create IP. Figure 7 summarises findings on the communitarian pluralist principles in the 
antecedent model rules and shows how they have been adapted in the FairShares Model.  
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Figure 7 – Communitarian Pluralism in the FairShares Model 
Proxy Indicator  Antecedent Models FairShares Model 
Multiple share classes Stewardship Shares - Class A Shares - Founder Shares  Founder Shares 
 Partnership Shares - Class B Shares  User Shares 
 Partnership Shares - Class C Shares - Labour Shares  Labour Shares 
 Investment Shares – Class A Shares - Investor Shares  Investor Shares 
Joint Ownership /  
Co-ownership 
Co-ownership (individual / organisational members)  Provisions for founder, user and labour shareholders to acquire 
investor shares.  Values realised by selling to mutual 
organisations established for employee, community or public 
benefit. 
Owners / Trustees from two 
or more stakeholders 
At least three classes of shareholder (or stakeholder) 
provided for at incorporation. 
 1 class at incorporation (founders), with 2 or 3 other classes 
established as the business develops (typically over 3 – 5 years). 
Governance 
Loose network of 
independent governing 
bodies 
Preference for unitary boards elected from each class of 
shareholder 
 Operationalised through main/sub boards elected by shareholder 
classes (elections triggered by a member threshold fixed at 
incorporation). 
Direct Democracy / 
Sociocracy 
All stakeholders have a route to membership 
Limited protection of minority interests 
 All stakeholders can become members and/or governors; explicit 
protection of minority interests (special resolutions); explicit 
provision for mediation to resolve member conflicts. 
Multiple beneficiary groups Stewards / Partners / Investors (Case 7.1) 
Class A, B and C (Case 7.3) 
Founders, Labour and Investors (Case 7.4) 
 User, Labour and Investor Shareholders; “community dividend” 
upon merger, acquisition or dissolution based on the level of 
public/charitable grants. 
Management 
Reconciliation / negotiation 
of political interests 
Case 7.1 - Electoral college voting in general meetings 
Case 7.3 – Employees hold the balance of power 
Case 7.4 – Classes of shareholder have same rights in GM 
 One member, one vote for ordinary and special resolutions; 
electoral college system when a poll is called; one member, one-
vote (then one class, one-vote) for special resolutions. 
Matrix management / dual 
reporting systems 
Case 7.1 – No specific provisions 
Case 7.3 – Entrepreneur(s) as main decision-maker(s) 
Case 7.4 – Dual reporting (executive and shareholders) 
 Flexible reporting system (accountability to executives, 
shareholder classes, and creators of IP). 
Member relations / culture of 
associative 
entrepreneurship/democracy 
Case 7.1 - Member-ownership culture with strong board 
Case 7.2 – User / producer member-ownership culture 
Case 7.3 – Entrepreneurial culture moderated / constrained 
by member-ownership 
Case 7.4 – Member-owner culture with clearly defined 
executive responsibilities 
 Member-ownership culture, with private and/or social investors 
approved by member resolution; provisions for delegation of 
executive powers to a CEO or executive group defined by the  
constitution; explicit provision for sharing IP through Creative 
Common licensing by members. 
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Implications for Theory and Practice 
Arthur el al. (2003) suggests that mutual principles encourage all primary stakeholders (producers, 
employees, consumers and users) to participate in the ownership, governance and management of the 
enterprises on which they depend.  These commitments – evident in the FairShares Model - are consistent 
with the advancement of ‘associative entrepreneurship’ (Scott-Cato et al., 2008) and ‘associative democracy’ 
that combine internal (democratic) and external (market-based) challenges to governing bodies (Hirst, 1994; 
Smith and Teasdale, 2012).  FairShares is primarily a contribution to a communitarian pluralist discourse on 
the constitution of social enterprises, but still retains element of ‘corporatist’ thinking and a mixed approach to 
developing common, joint and co-ownership. 
Ridley-Duff and Southcombe (2012) coined the phrase ‘socialised enterprise’ to describe the application of 
these principles, particularly the integration of primary stakeholders into systems for ownership, governance 
and management (see Appendix B).  In subsequent work (cited on the FairShares Wiki), further clarifications 
were published suggesting how ‘socialised’ enterprises differ from ‘privatised’ and ‘nationalised’ enterprises 
(Ridley-Duff, 2012, Figure 4).  ‘Privatised’ enterprises pursue strategies that secure monopoly (or, failing that, 
oligopoly) control over markets so that the wealth and power generated by producers and consumers can be 
appropriated by providers of financial capital.  ‘Nationalised’ enterprises use the agency of the state to secure 
access to market goods, and do so for either public benefit or to secure government interests.   
The FairShares Model promotes neither of these models – it promotes ‘socialised enterprises’ that regulate 
the allocation of wealth, power and knowledge to primary stakeholders while limiting the power and wealth of 
financial investors.  The FairShares Model limits the state’s ability to appropriate power from founders, labour, 
users or investors without their consent.  Even if they secure a stake, the voting system makes it impossible to 
use it against the interests of primary stakeholders.  Similarly, absentee-investors - even if they gain access to 
capital - have to share at least half their capital gains with (new) labour and user shareholders. 
In Phase 2 of this research, the take up these ideas in practice will be assessed.  In anticipating the next 
phase, it is – perhaps - significant that the FairShares Model has emerged from practice.  It comes from 
existing model rules for companies and co-operative societies that have been advanced by 
consultant-practitioners and academic sympathisers.  In all cases, the model rules reflect aggregations of 
experience after decades of involvement in social economy development (not just the recent period of 
governmental support).  In Phase 2, surveys and interviews with founders and supporters will inform a fuller 
assessment of its potential. 
This paper is limited to tracing its historical antecedents, and identifying core propositions on the allocation 
of wealth, power and knowledge.  In looking forward, any number of pathways are possible.  One - culled from 
the strapline of the FairShares Association – stands out.  It calls for a transition ‘from Fairtrade to FairShares’, 
perhaps reflecting a connection to fair trade through one set of antecedent model rules (7.2) and its authors’ 
stated involvement in the fair trade movement.  Just as fair trade has challenged how the benefits from market 
transactions should be divided between producers, consumers and business owners, so the FairShares 
Model offers a way to challenge how share transactions affect the division of benefits.  Given the renewed 
attention to addressing supply chain issues in the fair trade movement by finding new ways to enfranchise 
producers and consumers (Davies et al., 2009; Doherty et al., 2013), the FairShares Model could become a 
natural ally in the next phase of fair trade development. 
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Appendix A - Five Antecedents of the FairShares Model 
Model Rules Brief Description 
Case 7.1 
Stakeholder Model Ltd  
The rules were designed by Geof Cox Associates, a specialist in the development 
and support of Social Firms, and were published by the Common Cause 
Foundation.  Underpinned by a Company Limited by Shares, the model rules 
define the power of an active board, elected by each shareholder group.  Three 
share types are defined: 
 Stewardship Shares (for trustees / directors appointed for social purposes) 
 Partnership Shares (for employees and customers) 
 Investment Shares (for external supporters / social investors) 
Case 7.2 
Cooperative CIC Model  
 
Designed and published by Cooperatives UK in response to the introduction of 
Community Interest Company legislation in 2005.  Underpinned by a Company 
Limited by Guarantee or Shares, the model rules are framed to encourage active 
user and worker membership on the basis of one-person, one-vote, with a 
commitment to consult: 
 Employees 
 Funders 
 Suppliers 
 Customers 
 Community representatives 
Case 7.3 
NewCo Model of Social 
Enterprise 
 
 
Designed by Morgan Killick and Bill Barker in 2002, with support from the 
Sheffield Community Economic Development Unit.  Underpinned by a Company 
Limited by Shares, a 2004 version gave control and decision-making power to 
three classes of shareholder, and investment rights to a fourth: 
 Class A Shares (for social entrepreneurs) 
 Class B Shares (for social economy customers / clients) 
 Class C Shares (for employees) 
 Social Equity Shares (for philanthropic supporters / social investors) 
Case 7.4 
Surplus Sharing Model 
for Social Enterprise 
(CLS) 
 
 
With a heritage stretching back to the work of Guy Major and Gavin Body in the 
mid-1990s, the surplus sharing rules developed by Ridley-Duff at Sheffield 
Business School embrace co-operative principles across the labour/capital divide.  
The rules  provide for active membership control on the basis of one-person, one 
vote, with special provisions for issuing: 
 Founder Shares (for social entrepreneurs / social investors) 
 Labour Shares (for employees, workers and suppliers) 
 Investor Shares (for employees, workers and others chosen by members’). 
Somerset Rules 
IPS Multi-Stakeholder 
Co-operative 
With a heritage in co-operative, rather than company law, Somerset Model Rules 
have been adopted for the purchase of community shops, pubs and agriculture 
projects.  At incorporation, members define and label classes of shareholder and 
establish membership criteria.  As Somerset Co-operative Services explain: 
“They enable a co-operative enterprise to be 'shared' by more than one group 
of stakeholders.  For example, a community supported agriculture scheme 
could be 50% controlled by producers, and 50% by consumers. Or a business 
could be 60% controlled by its workers, and 40% by the local community” 
Source: http://www.somerset.coop/somersetrules 
Cases 1 – 4 based on cases 7.1 – 7.4 in Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011 
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 Appendix B - Socialisation and Social Purposes in Social Enterprise Theory 
Characteristic  Source  Socialisation  Social Purpose  
SEP = Social Enterprise Partnership, SAT = Social Audit Toolkit, ICA = International Co-operative Alliance, EMES = EMES Research Network, SEM = 
Social Enterprise Mark  
 Enterprise launched by a group of citizens  ICA, EMES  X    
 Open, voluntary membership  SEP, ICA  X    
 Worker and/or community ownership  SEP, SAT, ICA, EMES  X    
 Democratic governance/structure  SEP, SAT, ICA, EMES  X    
 Being open and accountable  SEP  X    
 Co-operative management  SEP, SAT, ICA  X    
 A participatory nature, which involves the persons affected by the activity  SEP, EMES, ICA  X    
 Decision-making power not based on capital ownership  ICA, EMES  X    
 The hiring of capital by labour  SAT, ICA  X    
 Surplus belongs to members  ICA  X    
 A high degree of autonomy  ICA, EMES, SEM  X    
 Cooperation with other co-operatives/social enterprises  SEP, ICA  X    
 A significant level of economic risk (by members/founders)  ICA, EMES  X X 
 Concerned with empowering members  ICA, SEP, SAT, EMES  X X 
 Using and developing volunteers  SEP  X X 
 Education of members and public in values and principles  ICA  X X 
 Developing common and shared values  SEP, SAT, ICA  X X 
 Bound to a set of beneficiaries or community  SEP, EMES  X X 
 Producing goods and/or selling services  EMES, SEM     X 
 Clear social, environmental and financial benefits  SAT, EMES, SEM     X 
 Creating (mostly) social wealth / limited private profit distribution  SEP, ICA, EMES, SEM     X 
 50% or more of trading surpluses (profit) invested in social/environmental 
purposes  
SEM     X 
 Minimum amount of paid work  EMES     X 
 Dissolution clause that ensures that all residual assets are used for 
‘social/environmental purposes’.  
SEM     X 
 Can demonstrate that social and environmental objects are being achieved  SAT, SEM     X 
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Notes 
                                         
 
1
  A Google search for the term "John Lewis Economy" (exact match) yielded 66,600 hits, while the 
terms "John Lewis State" (exact match) yielded 730,000 hits (on 1
st
 July 2013). 
2
  The arrangements of the Co-operative Group are summarised at www.co-operative.coop.  To find the 
information, navigate to Home -> Sustainability -> Delivering Value -> Modern Co-operation -> 
Democratic Structure. 
3
  Based on field notes collected by Ridley-Duff during a field visit on 5
th/
6
th
 March 2003. 
4
  After the Yugoslav wars, Yugoslavia divided in the following states: Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Hertzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia).  In 2006, Montenegro 
separated from Serbia.  
5
  Ridley-Duff was a co-founder in each case.  First Contact Software Ltd was co-founded by 5 other 
people, New Horizons Music Ltd with 3 others, and Social Exchange Ltd with 2 others. 
